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ABSTRACT 
The evolutionary spread of cheater strategies can destabilize populations engaging in social 
cooperative behaviors, thus demonstrating that evolutionary changes can have profound 
implications for population dynamics. At the same time, the relative fitness of cooperative traits 
often depends upon population density, thus leading to the potential for bi-directional coupling 
between population density and the evolution of a cooperative trait. Despite the potential 
importance of these eco-evolutionary feedback loops in social species, they have not yet been 
demonstrated experimentally and their ecological implications are poorly understood. Here, we 
demonstrate the presence of a strong feedback loop between population dynamics and the 
evolutionary dynamics of a social microbial gene, SUC2, in laboratory yeast populations whose 
cooperative growth is mediated by the SUC2 gene. We directly visualize eco-evolutionary 
trajectories of hundreds of populations over 50-100 generations, allowing us to characterize the 
phase space describing the interplay of evolution and ecology in this system. Small populations 
collapse despite continual evolution towards increased cooperative allele frequencies; large 
populations with a sufficient number of cooperators “spiral” to a stable state of coexistence 
between cooperator and cheater strategies. The presence of cheaters does not significantly affect 
the equilibrium population density, but it does reduce the resilience of the population as well as 
its ability to adapt to a rapidly deteriorating environment. Our results demonstrate the potential 
ecological importance of coupling between evolutionary dynamics and the population dynamics 
of cooperatively growing organisms, particularly in microbes. Our study suggests that this 
interaction needs to be considered in order to explain intraspecific variability in cooperative 
behaviors, and also that this feedback between evolution and ecology can critically affect the 
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demographic fate of those species that rely on cooperation for their survival. 
 
BLURB 
A new study finds that the evolution of social genes may be coupled with population dynamics, 
and dramatically affect ecological resilience, particularly in the face of rapidly deteriorating 
environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Evolutionary changes in a species can strongly affect its environment over the timescales where 
speciation typically occurs. While this long-term effect of evolution on ecology has been long 
appreciated, it is typically assumed that evolutionary dynamics occurs over timescales that are 
too long to affect the dynamics of population size in the short term[1]. For this reason, most 
models of population biology ignore evolutionary changes in the different species, implicitly 
assuming a separation of timescales between population dynamics and evolutionary biology [2]. 
However, recent experiments suggest that changes in allele frequency can occur over timescales 
that are comparable to those typical of population dynamics [1,3–6]. Given this overlap in 
timescales, evolutionary dynamics and population dynamics may be coupled in what has been 
termed an eco-evolutionary feedback loop [1,3].  
These eco-evolutionary feedback loops are predicted to be particularly strong in cooperatively 
growing species [7–11], which produce common goods and typically have larger fitness at large 
population densities than at low population densities [12–14]. Cooperative species can be 
challenged by the emergence of intraspecific “cheater” phenotypes, which take advantage of the 
common good produced by the community but do not contribute to its production. As a result, 
the cheaters may have higher fitness than cooperators and proliferate in the population at the 
expense of cooperators. The decline in cooperator numbers driven by evolutionary competition 
with the cheaters can have strong ecological consequences, as the ability of the population to 
produce the common good may be compromised [13]. These interactions have been predicted 
theoretically to yield an eco-evolutionary feedback between the allele frequency of a cooperative 
gene and the population size [7,8,10,11]. However, this bi-directional feedback has not been 
demonstrated experimentally, and the ecological consequences of such feedback are not known.  
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Microbes are remarkably social organisms [15], and are also amenable to laboratory 
experimentation. Very often, microbial cooperation results from the secretion of “public goods” 
to the media, such as quorum sensing molecules, extracellular enzymes, or the polymers that 
make up the fabric of biofilms. In some microbial species, population dynamics has been found 
to influence the evolution of cooperation via density-dependent selection [12,13,16,17]. In turn, 
it has also been found that, for some cooperatively growing species, the evolutionary competition 
between cheaters and cooperators can affect the growth of yeast [18,19] and bacterial [20] 
populations. Therefore, we reasoned that microbial ecosystems are likely candidates to display 
these predicted eco-evolutionary feedback loops. 
In this paper, we characterized an eco-evolutionary feedback loop in a social microbial species. 
Given that the secretion of public goods in microbes is ubiquitous [15], these eco-evolutionary 
feedback loops may play crucial roles in microbial ecosystems. Our aim is to investigate whether 
eco-evolutionary feedbacks do indeed play a role on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative 
traits, and what effect they play in the ecological properties of the populations where the 
evolution of cooperation is taking place. 
 
RESULTS 
Evolutionary dynamics of the SUC2 gene dramatically alters population dynamics 
 To explore these eco-evolutionary feedback loops experimentally, we utilized the cooperative 
growth of budding yeast in the sugar sucrose. This cooperative growth is mediated by a single 
cooperative gene, SUC2, which codes for invertase, an enzyme that breaks down sucrose into 
glucose and fructose [13]. Invertase is secreted to the periplasmic space between the cell 
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membrane and the cell wall [18]. As a result of this location outside the membrane, 99% of the 
glucose and fructose produced by invertase diffuses away to be consumed by other cells in the 
population, while only the remaining 1% is directly captured by the cell that produced it [18]. 
This behavior leads to a cooperative transformation of the environment by the cells: at low 
population density, the cells are too dilute to effectively transform the sucrose environment into a 
glucose environment, so the cells grow slowly on what little glucose they retain following 
sucrose hydrolysis. At high population density, however, the cells are able to produce enough 
glucose for the population to grow rapidly (as found in ref [14] and in Figure S1). Because of 
this density-dependent cooperative growth, a minimal starting population size is needed to 
survive successive growth-dilution cycles on batch culture [14,18] (Figure 1A,B, Materials and 
Methods). In the absence of evolutionary dynamics (SUC2 gene frequency of 100%), we observe 
either rapid collapse or rapid approach to a stable population size.  
The effect of SUC2 evolutionary dynamics on the population dynamics was assessed by growing 
mixed cultures of SUC2 carriers (cooperators), and a second strain with a SUC2 deletion 
(cheaters) [18]. Each strain was transformed with a fluorescent protein of different color, so 
cheaters and cooperators could be discriminated by flow cytometry (see Materials and Methods). 
Four cultures were inoculated with different initial SUC2 frequencies (from f=0.05 to f=0.5) and 
initial cell densities ranging from N=10
3
 to N=10
4
cells/L, and were then subject to a daily 
growth-dilution cycle (667x dilution factor) for five days. We found that the population 
dynamics are much more complicated than they were in the absence of evolutionary dynamics, 
with multiple cultures displaying seemingly erratic, non-monotonic changes in population size 
and in frequency of the SUC2 gene.  
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This experiment shows that evolutionary dynamics of the SUC2 gene, which is essential for cell 
growth under the conditions of the experiment, causes a dramatic change in the population 
dynamics. However, it is difficult to appreciate any specific patterns given the widely different 
and seemingly erratic behavior of both population and evolutionary dynamics when plotted 
separately. To gain insight into their relationship, we plot the trajectories followed by the 
different populations in an eco-evolutionary phase space formed by population density on one 
axis and the frequency of SUC2 on the other (Figure 1E). We find that these eco-evolutionary 
trajectories “spiral” in the density / frequency phase space, suggesting the presence of a coupling 
between population and evolutionary dynamics.  
This feedback can be captured by a simple phenomenological model that naturally incorporates 
the coupling between evolutionary dynamics and population dynamics (See references [14,16] 
and Supporting Information). The model assumes that the growth rate of all cells in the 
population depends on the density of SUC2 carriers (cooperators) in the population. Below a 
certain threshold, cooperator cells grow at a slow rate on what little glucose they retain, while 
“cheaters” grow even more slowly. Above that threshold, both cooperators and cheaters grow at 
a fast rate drawing from the common pool of glucose, but cheaters grow faster as they do not 
have the metabolic burden of expressing the SUC2 gene. The growth of both phenotypes below 
and above the cooperator threshold is described by coupled logistic equations, to account for the 
fact that cooperators and cheaters compete for the glucose made by the cooperators, as well as 
other metabolites in the media (Figure 1F and Figure S1). This simple model predicts an eco-
evolutionary phase space that is remarkably similar to our experimental measurements, with a 
separatrix dividing the phase space into two regions (Figure 2A). For population sizes larger than 
the separatrix, trajectories spiral to an eco-evolutionary equilibrium state characterized by co-
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existence between the cooperator and cheater phenotypes. For population sizes smaller than the 
separatrix, trajectories go extinct despite the fact that cooperators increase in frequency in the 
population (Figure 2A). 
 
Direct visualization of eco-evolutionary trajectories reveals the presence of a feedback loop 
between population and evolutionary dynamics of the SUC2 gene  
To test the phase-space mapping predicted by our model we scaled up the experiment and started 
sixty independent cultures, varying both the initial cell density and the initial frequency of the 
SUC2 gene in the population. Each of these cultures was subjected to daily growth-dilution 
cycles and both the cell density and frequency of the SUC2 gene were measured daily over the 
course of five days. We found a striking confirmation of the global eco-evolutionary feedback 
represented by spiral trajectories in the phase plane (Figure 2B). As predicted by the model, 
above the separatrix populations spiral to an equilibrium fixed point deq (N=5.78±0.2110
4 
cells/L, f=0.086±0.007; Mean±SE,N=3), while below the separatrix populations go extinct. In 
order to visualize this spiraling behavior close to equilibrium, we repeated the experiment by 
starting sixty mixed populations close to equilibrium, and followed them for eight days. The 
spiraling behavior was confirmed, as shown in Figure 2C. This experimentally observed 
behavior is consistent with the trajectories theoretically predicted by ecological public goods 
games [7,8,11]. 
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The evolutionary spread of cheaters does not cause early population collapse and does not 
significantly affect the productivity of the population 
The mapping of the eco-evolutionary space described above allows us to determine the fate of a 
cooperator population that is invaded by a cheater phenotype. A population of cooperators in 
equilibrium at ceq (5.96±0.1610
4 
cells/L, f=1.0; Mean±SE,N=3) that gets invaded by a SUC2 
cheater mutant  still falls to the right side of the separatrix  (See Figure 3A, where we represent, 
in light gray arrows, the trajectories for all of the populations we measured). Therefore, rather 
than collapsing, the population will spiral to the new eco-evolutionary fixed point deq. 
Furthermore, the size of the population at equilibrium in deq is very similar (smaller by less than 
10%) to that in the pure cooperator population ceq, indicating that the community can be 
supported by a relatively small fraction of cooperators.  
 
The evolutionary spread of cheaters decreases population resilience 
Given the modest deleterious effects caused by the spread of cheaters in the population, we 
wondered whether ecological properties might be affected by the presence of cheaters. We first 
noticed that while the population size in the eco-evolutionary equilibrium point deq is very 
similar to the population size for a pure cooperator population ceq, the distance between deq and 
the separatrix (Xd ; Figure 3A) is much smaller than the distance between the pure cooperator 
equilibrium ceq and the separatrix (Xc ; Figure 3A). This suggests that the resilience of the 
population in eco-evolutionary equilibrium is less than for a population of pure SUC2 carriers in 
equilibrium. To test this prediction, we performed a one-day dilution shock on six equilibrium 
populations of either pure or mixed populations. All six pure cooperator populations survived the 
one-day shock of dilution by a factor of 32,000X (as compared to the normal dilution by 667X 
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before and after the shock), whereas all six populations at equilibrium with cheaters went extinct 
(Figure 3B). The presence of cheaters in the population therefore reduces the resilience of the 
population, even if the productivity of the population is unchanged. We quantified the resilience 
of both pure cooperator and mixed populations by repeating this experiment for ten different 
disturbance strengths, and determined the fraction of populations that recovered from the shock 
(Figure 3C). This experiment confirmed that the resilience of a mixed population in eco-
evolutionary equilibrium at deq is about 5 times smaller than for pure cooperator populations, as 
we expected from visual inspection of the eco-evolutionary phase space.  
 
Rapid environmental deterioration leads to population collapse in the presence of cheater 
cells  
Given the importance of timescales to the presence of eco-evolutionary feedback, it is natural to 
also consider the effect of varying the rate of environmental change, particularly in the context of 
deteriorating environments. Our model predicts that mixed populations at eco-evolutionary 
equilibrium can survive slow but not sudden environmental deterioration (Figure 4A and Figure 
S2). In contrast, the survival of a population of cooperators is predicted to be independent of the 
rate of environmental deterioration (Figure 4A and Figure S2). A population initially growing in 
a benign environment (characterized by a low dilution factor), finds an eco-evolutionary 
equilibrium point deq,1 at low SUC2 frequency, at the right side of the separatrix. In a harsher 
environment (characterized by a higher dilution factor), the fraction of cooperators at the eco-
evolutionary equilibrium point deq,2 is predicted to be larger, and the separatrix line moves to the 
right and curves up (see Figure S2). Thus, the eco-evolutionary fixed point for a benign 
environment deq,1 may fall below the separatrix line for a harsher environment. As a result, if the 
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dilution factor suddenly switches from a low value (benign environment), to a high value (harsh 
environment), a population that was previously in the eco-evolutionary equilibrium point for the 
benign environment deq,1, finds itself below the new separatrix and out of the basin of attraction 
of the new equilibrium, and therefore goes extinct. 
We tested this prediction by first allowing six populations of pure cooperators and six mixed 
populations to reach equilibrium in a benign environment (667x dilution). We then subjected 
them to either rapid environmental deterioration by switching suddenly to a harsh environment 
(1,739x dilution), or slow environmental deterioration by increasing the dilution factor in two 
steps. As predicted, all of the pure cooperator populations were able to survive both fast and slow 
environmental deterioration (blue lines, Figure 4B-C). In contrast, while all of the mixed 
populations were able to adapt to the slow deterioration (Figure 4B), only one out of six adapted 
to the fast deterioration (Figure 4C and Figure S3). A similar outcome was observed when the 
two-step slow environmental deterioration was replaced by a gradually deteriorating 
environment (Figure S4). We therefore find that our populations in eco-evolutionary equilibrium 
are more sensitive to rapid environmental deterioration than are the pure cooperator populations.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Cooperation by secretion of common goods is widespread in microbes; from the polymers that 
form the matrix of biofilms to the exo-enzymes that degrade complex organic matter [21]. 
Understanding how these cooperative traits are maintained in populations is an essential problem 
of deep importance not only in evolutionary biology, but also in microbial ecology and systems 
biology [15,17,22–26]. An essential feature of the eco-evolutionary feedback in our system is the 
fact that cooperators have preferential access to the common good that they produce [16,18,27]. 
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This preferential access creates the density-dependent selection that favors cooperators at low 
densities and cheaters at high densities, which is essential for the feedback loop. Indeed, recent 
modeling work [9] has suggested that limiting the diffusion of a common good may result in eco-
evolutionary equilibrium between cooperators and cheaters, and even predicts oscillatory 
behavior similar to our experimental observations [9]. Our findings may therefore extend to other 
microbial systems exhibiting similar patterns of density-dependent growth resulting from 
preferential access to the common good. 
The presence of density-dependent selection provides a clear causal effect between population 
dynamics and evolutionary dynamics [28]. In addition to population density [12,17], other 
ecological factors such as disturbance frequency [29], population dispersal [30,31], resource 
supply [32,33], spatial structuring of populations [10,18,34], the presence of mutualisms [35–37] 
or the presence of a competing species in the environment [16], or often play an important role in 
the evolution of cooperation. The effect that these and other ecological factors play on the 
evolution of cooperation is well understood [34,38]. However, the reverse process, i.e. the effect 
that the evolution of cooperative traits may have on the ecological properties of populations is 
not as well understood [39]. Previous studies had found that under some conditions, the 
evolutionary competition between cooperators and cheaters may have effects on the productivity 
of the population [19] or in its growth rate [18]. The experiments reported here indicate that this 
effect of evolution on population dynamics further feeds back into the evolutionary competition 
between cheaters and cooperators. 
 
Understanding the effects of rapid evolution in ecological systems [3,6,40–44], and in particular 
the possible emergence of feedback loops between ecology and evolution, has recently attracted 
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great interest in the ecological and evolutionary biology communities [1,3,5,6,36,38,40–45]. In 
spite of their expected importance (and even though the idea that evolution and population 
dynamics may be coupled dates back at least to the 1960’s; see [41] and references therein), the 
exploration of eco-evolutionary feedback between population and evolutionary dynamics and 
their ecological and evolutionary consequences is still in its infancy. Some recent studies have 
found that eco-evolutionary feedbacks may affect other ecological parameters such as the phase 
and period of predator-prey oscillations [42]. Our study highlights the potential importance of the 
coupled interaction between evolutionary and population dynamics in growing microbial 
communities, and suggests that this interaction needs to be considered in order to explain 
intraspecific variability in cooperative behaviors, and the demographic fate of those species that 
rely on cooperation for their survival. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Strains 
Strains JG300A (cooperators) and JG210C carrying a SUC2 deletion (cheaters) were 
employed
15
. JG300A was derived from BY4741 strain of Saccharomyces cerevisiae (mating type 
a, EUROSCARF). It has a wild-type SUC2 gene, and constitutively expresses YFP from the 
ADH1 promoter (inserted using plasmid pRS401 with a MET17 marker). It also has a mutated 
HIS3 (his31). JG210C is a SUC2 deletion strain (EUROSCARF Y02321, SUC2::kanMX4), and 
constitutively expresses dTomato from the PGK1 promoter (inserted using plasmid pRS301 
containing a HIS3 marker).  
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Culture conditions  
Cells were grown in synthetic media (YNB and CSM-his; Sunrise Science, CA) containing 2% 
sucrose, 0.001% glucose, and 8 g/mL histidine. Cultures were grown in the 60 internal wells of 
a Falcon flat-bottom 96-well plate (BD Biosciences, CA), each containing 200µL of the culture. 
The plates were incubated at 30
o
C, shaking at 800rpm. The external wells were filled with 
200µL of growth media. The plate was covered with parafilm. Cultures were grown for 23.5 hr, 
and then diluted into fresh growth media by a 667x dilution factor, unless otherwise noted. The 
diluted samples were placed on a new plate, and incubated again for 23.5 hr. These serial 
growth-dilution cycles were interrogated for several days. Note that since earlier studies were 
performed in conditions where population density at the beginning of each growth cycle was 
kept constant, this eco-evolutionary feedback had not been observed before[18]. 
 
Measurement of cell density and cooperator frequency 
 At the end of each growth period, the optical density at 620nm on each well was determined 
with a Thermo Scientific Multiskan FC microplate spectrophotometer. A 10µL sample of each 
well was then transferred to a new plate containing 190µL sterile Cellgro PBS buffer 
(Mediatech, VA). These were then scanned at a high-throughput BD LSRII-HTS analyzer. Flow 
cytometry was used to determine the correspondence between cell density and the optical density 
measured at the plate reader (see Figure S5), as well as to identify cheaters and cooperators by 
their fluorescence emission (see Figure S6).  
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Figures for Main Text 
Figure 1. Population dynamics in the presence and the absence of evolutionary dynamics. 
Multi-day growth-dilution cycles demonstrate that evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative gene 
may dramatically affect population dynamics. (A-B) Yeast populations consisting exclusively of 
cooperator cells rapidly converge to an equilibrium population size in the absence of 
evolutionary dynamics.(C) Four different populations consisting of a mixture of SUC2 carriers 
and deletion mutants were subject to eight days of growth dilution cycles. Populations started at 
different population densities and SUC2 frequencies in the population. (D) Evolutionary 
dynamics for the same four populations as in (C) are represented by the same colors. Plots of the 
population and evolutionary dynamics show seemingly erratic, non-monotonic behavior. (E)  By 
constructing an eco-evolutionary phase-space formed by the population size and the frequency of 
the SUC2 gene in the population, we find that the four populations in (C-D) follow well defined 
trajectories. Each trajectory corresponds to the evolutionary and population dynamics of the 
same color. (F), A simple conceptual model rationalizes the eco-evolutionary trajectories; Gray 
circles represent cooperators, white circles represent cheaters. 
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Figure 2. Visualization of eco-evolutionary trajectories. (A) Simulation of the eco-evolutionary 
growth model (see SI) over successive growth-dilution cycles. Gray arrows mark the day-to-day 
change in frequency of the SUC2 gene (f) and the population density (N). The eco-evolutionary 
phase space formed by N and f is divided in two regions by a separatrix line (black dashed). 
Above the separatrix, feedback between N and f results in trajectories spiraling toward an eco-
evolutionary equilibrium point where cooperators and cheaters co-exist at deq (red dot). Below 
the separatrix populations go extinct despite the cooperators growing in frequency. In the 
absence of cheaters, the population dynamics have a stable fixed point at ceq (blue dot) and an 
unstable fixed point at cunstable (White circle). (B) Trajectories in the phase space for sixty 
cultures over five growth-dilution cycles. As predicted, a separatrix line divides the phase space 
in two regions: to the right trajectories spiral to an eco-evolutionary equilibrium and to the left 
trajectories lead to population collapse as cooperators increase in frequency. (C) A second set of 
sixty experimental populations were started in the vicinity of the co-existence equilibrium point 
deq and followed for eight days, further illustrating the spiraling behavior and thus the presence 
of a feedback loop.  
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Figure 3. The presence of cheaters cells decreases the resilience of a population. (A)  180 eco-
evolutionary trajectories corresponding to three different experiments are plotted in light gray. 
On top, we represent the population dynamics equilibrium point for pure cooperator cultures ceq 
(blue dot) and the eco-evolutionary equilibrium point deq (red dot). The blue arrow marks the 
distance between ceq and the separatrix (Xc), and the red arrow marks the distance between deq 
and the separatrix (Xd). (B) Populations were started near ceq (blue) or deq (red) at a dilution 
factor of 667x. A large disturbance was applied on the third day of culture, by increasing the 
dilution factor to 32,000x for one day (top panel). Pure cooperator populations were able to 
recover, but the mixed cooperator/cheater populations in eco-evolutionary equilibrium went 
extinct. (C)  Survival probability as a function of the strength of the perturbation (i.e. dilution 
shock). The presence of cheaters (red circles) decreases the population resilience, i.e. the 
maximum dilution shock that the population can withstand, relative to pure cooperator 
populations (blue circles). Error bars were estimated assuming binomial sampling (N=6), and 
represent a 68.27% confidence interval. 
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Figure 4. The presence of cheaters makes a population unable to survive rapidly 
deteriorating environments. (A), Schematic representation of the phase space for two different 
dilution factors, as obtained in simulations (see FigureS 2). For a benign environment (low 
dilution factor of 667x) the basin of attraction for the eco-evolutionary equilibrium point deq,1 is 
colored in light gray. For a harsh environment (characterized by a higher dilution factor of 
1,739x) the basin of attraction for eco-evolutionary equilibrium point deq,2 is shaded in black. A 
population in the benign equilibrium at deq,1 that is suddenly switched to the harsh environment 
will go extinct, as it is out of the basin of attraction for deq,2. (B) This prediction was tested 
experimentally by bringing to equilibrium six pure cooperator populations and six mixed 
cooperator/cheater populations (all at a low dilution of 667x). The dilution factor was suddenly 
changed to 1,739x on day 3 (top panel). All six pure cooperator populations tested (lower panel, 
blue) were able to withstand the rapid deterioration. However, only one out of six mixed 
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populations (lower panel, red) that were originally near eco-evolutionary equilibrium in the 
benign environment (for a dilution factor of 667x) were able to survive the rapid environmental 
deterioration. (C) A slow environmental deterioration was applied by increasing the dilution 
factor from 667x to 1,739x in two steps (upper panel). In this case, all six mixed populations 
were able to survive the deterioration (as did all six pure cooperator populations).   
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Figure S1 
 
 
Figure S1: Cooperator growth is well described by a two-phase logistic growth model. A, 
Cultures of the cooperator strain were grown at 30C for 20hr in 96-well BD microplates in the 
same growth media as in all other experiments in this article. The plate was incubated in a 
Varioskan Flash plate reader, which allowed us to automatically measure the optical density 
(OD620) of the cultures every 15min. Cultures were started at different initial cell densities, which 
allowed us to determine the growth rate as a function of density and distinguish two regimes. 
The growth rates at low and high densities were obtained from the raw data as previously 
described[14,18]. We plot here the growth rate per capita as a function of cell density (blue dots), 
and find that it is well fitted by the bi-phasic logistic model describe in equation SI-1 (black 
line). This indicates that the bi-phasic logistic growth model is a reasonable phenomenological 
model for our experiments. Note that the growth conditions differed substantially from our other 
experiments in the following: (i) The plates were not covered with parafilm, which may have 
resulted in different levels of oxygen in the sample, as well as increased evaporation; (ii) the 
plates were not shaken continuously, but only for a period of 2min immediately preceding OD 
measurement; and (iii) the environment of the plates was not an incubator, but at a plate reader, 
so that the temperature controls were presumably different. Therefore the quantitative parameters 
extracted from the fit to the growth curves, cannot be directly extrapolated to our experiments. B, 
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Schematic illustration of the bi-phasic Lotka-Volterra model of competition between cooperators 
and cheaters. The growth rate for cooperators and cheaters is represented as a function of 
cooperator density (note that this cartoon is a simplification, whose purpose is to develop 
intuition about the meaning of the different parameters). We wish to express our gratitude to 
Andrew Chen for collecting the data presented in A.  
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Figure S2: Estimation of co-existence fixed points and their basin of attraction from the 
model.  In order to estimate the location of the separatrix (the line that marks the basin of 
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attraction of the coexistence fixed points deq) at different dilution factors, we started the 
simulations at carrying capacity and multiple different values for the cooperator fraction. The 
separatrix locations for a low dilution factor (667x) (A,C) and a high dilution factor (1,739x) 
(B,D) are shown in linear and log-linear scales (red dots), together with a polynomial fit (blue 
lines) and the prediction of a null model ignoring eco-evolutionary feedback (gray dashed line), 
which corresponds to the curve in the eco-evolutionary space where the cooperator density is Nc 
=  cunstable; i.e. the curve given by f = cunstable/N. As one would expect, the separatrix follows 
closely the null model at low population densities (where Nc+Nd/K<<1 and the feedback is 
weak) and deviates from it at higher population densities (where Nc+NdK and feedback is 
stronger). Note that for a dilution factor of 667x, cunstable=440 cells/μL, which is well below the 
carrying capacity of 83,341 cells/μL. Also, we note that the deviation from the null model is 
larger at the harsh environment (dilution factor 1,739x) than at the benign environment. This is 
because cunstable =9,330 for the harsh environment, which is much larger than for the benign 
environment, and already close to the carrying capacity. For this reason, the separatrix deviates 
sooner from the null model prediction. In E,F we simulate trajectories that were started near to 
the separatrix, on top of the the separatrix, or below the separatrix for both benign (E) and harsh 
(F) dilution factors (blue). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3 
 
 
Figure S3: Effect of fast and slow environmental deterioration on the eco-evolutionary 
phase space. The data represented in figure 4 is projected into the eco-evolutionary phase space. 
Black and grays arrows represent the eco-evolutionary trajectories associated to figures 4B (rapid 
deterioration) and 4C (slow deterioration), respectively. 
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Figure S4 
 
 
 
Figure S4: Adaptation to gradual environmental deterioration. The experiment in figure 4C 
was repeated but, rather than changing the environment in two steps, we slowly increased the 
dilution factor (A) from 667x to 1739x. B, All populations, both pure (blue) and mixed (red), 
survived the slow deterioration. 
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Figure S5 
 
 
 
 
Figure S5: Calibration flow cytometer – OD meter. A calibration is performed to quantify the 
relationship between cell density (as determined by flow cytometer analysis, which allows us to 
count the number of cells in 10 uL cultures), and optical density (OD620). The relationship 
between the two is linear; we obtain a reasonable fit to the line y=14.52+69561 x (solid gray 
line) 
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Figure S6: Separation of Cheaters and Cooperators by the flow cytometer. Typical data 
corresponding to flow cytometry analysis of mixed cultures suspended on PBS media. 
Cooperators and cheaters form two distinct populations in the space formed by yellow and red 
fluorescence emission; cooperators express YFP constitutively, and therefore have strong 
emission in the yellow, but low emission in the red; cheaters express a red protein, dTomato, and 
therefore have strong emission in the red, but low emission in the yellow. Individual cells could 
thus be identified as one or the other by virtue of their different spectral fluorescence emission. 
